Canadian Police College Discussion Paper Series

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Change and Innovation in Canadian Policing

The Canadian Police College is pleased to present a Discussion Paper Series designed to explore thoughts, ideas and developing practices under the theme of "Change and Innovation in Canadian Policing". Leading experts have been commissioned to introduce readers to the latest thinking and research on a number of current policing issues and innovations in order to inform and stimulate further discourse on the future of policing and public safety in Canada.

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Understanding the Historical Relationship between Economics and Change in Policing: A Policy Framework

Michael Kempa

This discussion paper by Prof. Michael Kempa addresses the challenges for public policing in Canada posed by current global political and economic pressures and the resulting restructuring of public sector institutions like the police. By examining various stages in the history of Western political economy, the author establishes the important relationship between economic transformation, changing government philosophies and policing change and reform. This historically based analysis of the development of public policing, argues that we are currently in a period of great political and economic transition, one in which our policing philosophies, institutions and practices are becoming unsustainable and unable to effectively and efficiently meet current and future policing needs. Like previous historical periods contemporary policing will need to change and evolve in response to these powerful economic and social forces.

Michael Kempa is an Associate Professor of Criminology at the University of Ottawa and a freelance investigative journalist. Central to his work is the drive to untangle the connections between policing, politics and economics. He has published widely in leading academic journals, including the British Journal of Criminology, Theoretical Criminology, and the American Annals of Political and Social Science. He has also translated research for a wide public audience in such outlets as The Globe and Mail, Toronto Star, CBC Radio, and the Walrus Magazine.

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Editor's Introduction

To understand the current environment of Canadian policing and the increasing pressures for change and reform to the current policing model, it is useful to examine how public policing in the past was also shaped and influenced by historical, political and economic circumstances. This history based discussion paper by Prof. Michael Kempa is a timely reminder that the creation of the modern public police by Sir Robert Peel was at the time a radicle and innovative response to the new problems of urban crime and disorder caused by set of specific economic and political circumstances. Historical analysis reveals that major changes in the model of public policing have typically been responses to transformative changers in the philosophies and economics of government. It is in this historical context that he examines the current political economy of public policing, describing it as being characterized by global economic uncertainty, massive technological change and neo-liberal government philosophies that want to limit the cost and size of government and their public services. Canada's current expansive and expensive policing model is the product of a more prosperous and expansive era when governments could afford to grow the reach and cost of public services, like the police. Kempa argues that as result the current policing model we have developed in is no longer financially or politically sustainable, nor desirable given the policing challenges of the 21st century. He argues that a combination of current and future social, economic and political pressures require a new more complex efficient and responsive networked policing model, one that better utilizes diversity, education, research and innovation and professional leadership. In short, just like Peels model of public policing was a creative response to the particular policing challenges of the day, Kempa argues that our current economic and social environment also requires a different and innovative police response.

Dr. Christopher Murphy, Series Editor

Christopher Murphy is a Professor of Sociology and Social Anthropology at Dalhousie University. His work focuses primarily on Canadian Policing and he has published numerous articles and reports on varied policing topics such as: police change and reform, new models of policing and security, public and private policing, post 9/11 policing and police research and policing policy.

Introduction

This paper addresses the challenges for public policing and public safety in Canada posed by the current global political and economic crisis and the resulting restructuring of public sector institutions like the public police.

At various stages in modern Western history, economic downturn and restructuring has been followed by government reorganization. And each time this has happened, there have been major changes in the ways in which policing has been thought about, organized and practiced. Government and policing change comes because shifts in economics create new societal pressures that open up new opportunities for crime and present different challenges for collective order. One way to put it is: What we produce, transport, sell and consume opens up new opportunities for crime and changes social expectations about the role of government and the police. And, at the same time that major economic shifts create new pressures and challenges, these same shifts also create new opportunities for responding to crime: Where the challenges change and new technologies are at our disposal, it is easier to think about and go about the business of setting up policing in new ways. For all of these reasons, major policing reform occurs in every era of major economic change.

In this discussion paper I will illustrate that the particular historical conditions that were necessary for the birth and rise to dominance of the conventional reactive, uniformed public policing model no longer hold – and that a major recalibration of the current "policing system" is therefore not only inevitable, but something to welcome.

We are currently in a time period of great political and economic transition ... our policing philosophies, institutions, and practices are not only increasingly expensive, but are also imperfectly suited to current and future policing needs.

We are currently in a time period of great political and economic transition, one in which our policing philosophies, institutions, and practices are not only increasingly expensive, but are also imperfectly suited to current and future policing needs. This situation presents us all with not only a challenge but also an opportunity to get out in front of the inevitable changes and innovations that will occur. I seek to provide a historically-grounded analysis of the important relationship between policing reform and economics conditions, in the hopes of providing a broader perspective for the policing reforms that lie ahead as the Canadian police community grapples with the many financial and other challenges it faces. In addition, the paper offers some speculation on

the possible future of policing in Canada if focused action is not undertaken in the near future. Finally the paper provides commentary on directions for progressive police reform by drawing upon innovative examples from Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States and Australia.

What is Policing?

Policing– in the broadest sense – is often described as the challenge of how to best achieve collective safety and individual well-being (Dubber and Valverde 2006). While collective safety and individual well-being remain the central purposes of policing, what has changed are the ways in which we have organized public and private policing to achieve these broad aims. And shifting economic circumstances have often provided the push needed to recalibrate the "system for policing" in order to continue to achieve policing's broadest social and political aims. Over time, these systems or models of policing have taken on very different forms – often shapes that would be unrecognizable as examples of policing to our 21st-century sensibilities.

Instead of men and women in uniform, the system for policing at one point in the Western experience consisted of domestic monetary, economic and foreign trade policy – on the basis that it was believed that maintaining a growing market would furnish the wealth necessary to maintain collective order and individual well-being. Over the mercantilist epoch of European history, roughly 1600-1800, governments saw flourishing markets as the source of collective safety and well-being – and so it followed that government activities to maintain the growth of markets were described as "acts of police" (Neocleous 1998; 2007).

It was only through an extraordinary and interrelated set of conceptual, structural, and instrumental conditions that the policing system gradually came to take its modern form: the public police, consisting of men (and, later, also women) in uniform who are responsible for maintaining order and preventing crime through keeping up an "unremitting watch" over collective activities (Reiner 2010). Moving from economic policy to men and women in uniform is a big shift in the policing system – and understanding how we got here requires us to pull apart the three main ways in which the policing system is related to big shifts in economics.

The Relationship between Policing Recalibration and Economics

There are three ways in which policing and economics are mutually related: conceptually (at the level of ideas), structurally (at the level of social forces and institutions) and

instrumentally (at the level of individuals).

Conceptual Links

The ways in which societies in different time periods tend to think about the nature and purposes of markets, civil society and state governments set limits on the ways in which we are capable of conceiving of policing as an issue and institutional response (Foucault 1977/2007). How we think markets should serve us, how we think markets tend to behave, and what we feel the proper relationships between governments and markets ought to be, all greatly impact our views and beliefs about what policing and police are and could be.

Critically, the belief that "policing" is limited to maintaining an unremitting watch over collective goings-on and enforcing the law in mostly public space is deeply dependent on the "liberal", capitalist political idea that there is a sharp divide to be drawn between the public and private spheres. Where governments believe that markets ought best to serve individuals and tend to perform strongest with minimal amounts of government regulation, they have separated the concept of "policing" from any form of market or government regulation or intervention. On the flip side, when governments begin to rethink the role for the state in stemming some of the worst excesses of market instability, it tends to follow that their concept of policing becomes broader – moving beyond the institution of the public police to include other security and regulatory agencies, all working together in partnership. Whenever governments think they have a larger role in acting in the private sphere to regulate and shape markets, their concept and aims for "policing" tend to become more ambitious to include all manner of community safety and social regulation issues; and whenever governments have more faith in the power of the private sphere to take care of itself, their dominant ways of thinking about policing become narrower to focus on strict law enforcement.

Structural Links

The growth and occasional decline and reorganization of financial markets produce structural pressures that both force and enable different possible policing responses. When markets move, they enable and constrain government action and prompt policing adaptation. Poor market performance, for example, diminishes the tax base and thus diminishes government resources. In this case, governments begin to run deficits and must naturally begin to search for more efficiency in all its public services, including policing. In this case, police are forced to do more with less and must adapt to the current economic environment.

But structural forces do not just squeeze police services. Structural changes in how human beings move around and do business with one another – often related to new advances in technology – also create opportunities for new forms of crime, and, in turn, open up new options for crime control. In other words, the policing and security needs of a farm-based society are very different from the policing and security needs of a thriving urban industrialist society. In turn, the security needs of today's knowledge-based, service-oriented global economy are also very different.

For example, internet crime, sophisticated forms of financial fraud involving elaborate investment products, transnational organized crime networks, diffuse terrorism, and the illegal trade in humans are all crimes that have flourished in the new opportunity structure of our emerging global economy. However, in an increasingly global world that is linked through hyper-communications technology, we are also more capable of dealing with these problems through networks of new technological resources. Global partnerships, electronic surveillance and massive data analysis and storage capacity make it possible for police organizations to deal with new forms of crime that would have been structurally impossible a few short years ago.

There are two particular structural economic concepts that are essential to understanding how policing has evolved to date: The "free rider" problem, and the Pareto law.

The free rider problem occurs whenever the benefits of a particular good or service – such as the provision of public safety and security – are not limited just to those who pay for them. At every stage in history where security benefits have drifted across the boundaries of the communities that pay for them, there has been a push for public policing (Spitzer and Scull 1977). Simply put, those who pay for private security are only happy when the benefits are kept to themselves – if the benefits spill over to neighbors and potential business competitors, it is better from a business perspective to pay into collective security provided to all through a public agency. On the other hand, when security benefits can be neatly contained, private interests often prefer to invest in their own security because of the degree of control over policing this allows them to maintain.

The Pareto law identifies one of the key, assumed fingers on the "invisible hand" of markets. It states that any workers that add cost without adding equal or greater value to the production and sale of a product undermine the maximization of profit and competitive advantage, and are thereby naturally eliminated

over time. As such, the size of particular industries tends to be self-regulating.

The Pareto law, however, breaks down where a good or service is "intangible" – such as the provision of "security." Security is not only about actual safety but also a psychological sense of well-being and freedom from harm. In theory, appetites for security could be fanned indefinitely, as there are no real physical limits for how much "security" a human being could hope to consume. It follows that a nearly infinite number of producers, marketers, and distributors could be added to the production chain for policing and security services, where the free hand of the market is left to rein in the absence of any other form of regulation and control. Through history, we have tended to see the greatest periods of public and private policing expansion at those moments in which social and psychological appetites for security were not tamed through government regulation or corporate responsibility. At various moments in time, the public appetite for security has become "unanchored" from the actual risks of crime victimization – and this has driven the expansion of both public and private policing. However when governments run out of money and can no longer meet unanchored public demand private providers step in to fill the void and often further fan the flames of demand- as evident in the recent expansion of the private security industry.

Instrumental Links

People respond to changing markets by making new security demands and proposing different kinds of security solutions when markets shift. In other words, new problems and opportunities for policing create spaces for people to push competing agendas about the institutional forms that the system of policing ought to take.

Champions of particular types of policing reform have tended to find success for their ideas where they were aligned with dominant structural pressures and popular conceptualizations of policing and governance. Sir Robert Peel, for example, only succeeded in selling the long-running and often-rejected proposal to develop uniformed public policing when the thriving industrial metropolis of London required a stable and uninterrupted flow of goods and labor, one that only a formal, uniformed, paid public police service could provide (Reiner 2010; Williams 2003).

...people matter: influential reformers seize upon structural and conceptual shifts in economics to successfully push their agendas...

At the instrumental level, therefore, people matter: influential reformers seize upon structural and conceptual shifts in economics to successfully push their agendas; on the other hand, people with very good ideas may find

their proposals out of fashion if they are not aligned with what governments are expecting to hear or are capable of funding. As figure one illustrates: In order to account for shifts in the calibration of the policing system, we must look for the ways in which concepts, structural pressures, and powerful individuals have interacted at any given moment in time.

Armed with this analytic framework, we can trace the history of recalibrations of the policing system over time, highlighting the ways that policing reforms have reflected changes in the economy and society. This approach sets the context for a discussion and analysis of current challenges and options for the future of policing in Canada.


Instrumental: influential reformers push new ideas
Structural: Pressures Build and Opportunity Structures Emerge
Conceptual: Foundational Ideas

Fig.1. The interactive elements of policing reform: Concepts set foundations, which contribute to structural pressures, which are seized upon by influential reformers who push new concepts.

The Difficult Birth and Gradual Rise of Public Policing

Policing has taken on very different forms over time – some of which are utterly alien to what we recognize as policing today.

Throughout mercantilist history (roughly 1600-1800), the system for policing mostly referred to monetary policy – as everything that sovereigns and later elected governments did to ensure the growth of the market in service of collective order (Foucault 1977/2007; Neocleous 1998). Growing markets were seen as the source of social stability, because they created the wealth necessary to bankroll a strong sovereign. And within this framework,

"crime control" was largely seen as a private affair, driven first by the propertied classes, and later the industrialist classes, who developed their own security interests in the dense factory centres within cities and more remote "company towns" (Spitzer and Scull 1977). Structurally speaking, the new merchant class was flush with profits and could finance its own policing. Instrumentally, it suited them to pay for their own private security, as their factory spaces were isolated enough that they retained most of the security benefits that they bought.

As mercantilism gave way to the more classic liberal capitalism of Adam Smith (towards the end of the 1700s), people began to think that the power of markets lay less in enriching the sovereign – and more in offering reward to the industrious and responsible individuals who worked within them. The key to an orderly society lay less in intimidating citizens with a powerful government and more in rewarding them for their good behavior in the marketplace. In the era of booming markets, Smith and other classic liberals thought the best thing to do to get markets to grow was to get government out of the way. In this conceptual framework, the system for policing was again recalibrated, turning away from monetary policy to focus upon order maintenance and crime control in the public sphere.

For these classic liberal police reformers a "system" for public order was required to set stable and crime-free foundations upon which self-regulating markets could flourish. Within this conceptual framework, it is possible to begin think of policing as being about men (and later women) in uniform exercising surveillance and law enforcement powers in public space. Nevertheless, the birth of the public police was a long time in coming, with multiple failed policing initiatives during the period of 1750-1829. It was only when Smith's ideas had become dominant, and rebellion throughout the colonies, especially Ireland, had begun to threaten market growth at home in the London Metropole, that influential reformer Sir Robert Peel could sell the radical concept of state-supported public policing to a skeptical propertied class of British parliamentarians.

Through Peel's canny move of first introducing the "extraordinary technology" of institutionalized public policing in Ireland – a foreign land whose inhabitants were generally considered to be inferior, and thereby incapable of liberal "governance at-a-distance" – he was able to gradually wear down resistance to the introduction of a public policing system in London (Reiner 2010; Williams 2003). In addition industrialism had also matured so that the tax base had expanded to the point where the state could fund modern public policing.

The difficult birth of public policing in 1829 was

to be followed by its very slow spread across England and throughout the colonies: It would be over a hundred years before public policing would finally have expanded to the point of overshadowing the many private and civil forms of policing and crime prevention that had dominated through centuries of modern Western history. The period between 1829 and 1929 was a century of "mixed models" of policing (Reiner 2010). Alongside the gradual expansion and consolidation of modern, uniformed public policing, many developing industries and corporations preferred to take care of their own security, hiring private actors to secure the transport of their goods, police the morals and the "sticky fingers" of their employees and when necessary, protect private property from growing labor militancy.

Throughout Britain, Canada and most especially in the United States, many local governments were resistant to the expansion of Peel's policing model, as, they preferred to retain a higher degree of control over local networks of community watchers, thief-takers, and other non-state actors. These private bodies therefore continued to be highly engaged in the processes of community safety alongside growing public police agencies until the end of the Second World War.

Local government resistance to expanding public policing only collapsed at the point that powerful industrialists began to exert pressure on the state to invest in more public policing. The evolving urban landscape – where factories became increasingly mixed-in with residential and commercial property – made it very difficult for factory and business owners to keep the benefits of the private security they paid for to themselves and away from their competitors. A developing free rider problem meant it was better for businesses' bottom lines to pool their resources to purchase security for everybody: if one company bought its own security, other companies benefitted, and that company would be at a competitive disadvantage by having to pass along its security costs to its consumers.

The Great Depression of 1929 was a turning point in the expansion in modern public policing. The sudden and outright collapse of the economy challenged classic liberals' faith in the power of the free market to regulate itself, and wiped out the entrepreneurial spirit and capacity of citizens. These conceptual and structural shifts set the stage for Franklin Delano Roosevelt's "new deal" approach to welfare liberalism. The idea was to construct a social safety net under all citizens, to support them – in instance of illness o untimely job loss or bankruptcy. Public education, public housing, public retirement funds and all manner of social services were expanded, designed to give everyone the confidence it was felt they needed to get the depressed economy going

again. The social services were staffed by bureaucrats and experts thought to be qualified to act on behalf of citizens – and this conceptual framework dominated Western politics until the 1970s. It is in this context, the idea of professionalized public policing fit, expanded and came to dominate (O'Malley and Palmer 1996).

A post-war population boom supplied the labor necessary for a thriving market. Combined with a reliable energy supply, governments had all the resources they needed to expand the entire social safety net, including the system for public policing. These were the salad days of Western, industrial, liberal capitalism in which the modern public policing project could and did flourish. Professional policing was an effective tool to deal with the relatively local, property-oriented minor crime and public order issues of the post-war period.

However cracks in the conceptual primacy of welfare liberalism have been showing since the outset of the 1970s. The energy crises that began in that decade disrupted the engines of industrial capitalism, which, combined with massive social and cultural change, greatly challenged centralized, professional bureaucracies: they had fewer resources and citizens became less deferential to expert authority. Market volatility, stagflation, rising unemployment, and escalating crime shook the consensus about what the state ought to do to ensure the growth of markets. Within this volatile and uncertain market economy public police agencies were increasingly pressured to reform in order to find efficiencies to meet government budget shortfalls.

During the 1980s and 1990s, the neo-liberal values of "rolling back" government became increasingly popular. Within this worldview, it is considered necessary to scale back the social safety net in order to expose citizens to the rigors and risks of the marketplace, learn from their triumphs and mistakes and rekindle their individual entrepreneurial spirit. The premise was that governments should do less so that citizens will learn to do more for themselves and their communities.

In this context, ideas for extending the system for policing beyond the institution of the public police, and to responsiblising citizens to contribute more to their own safety became increasingly popular. Private security would thereby again become an increasingly "thinkable" option for corporate, community, and citizen safety (Shearing and Stenning 1983). In parallel, "community policing" in its many guises became the dominant philosophy guiding most public policing reform (Reiner 2010).

In an era of renewed faith in the power of free markets to achieve broad social benefit, the concept of "policing" was conceptually

separated from government activity in the private sphere, or "regulation." Although the system for policing was increasingly citizen-driven and open to privatization, nevertheless the fundamental belief that policing ought to be restricted to surveillance and rules enforcement in public places and new forms of mass private space, rather than any form of market regulation or monetary policy, remained dominant.

As is clear in this background history, the Western "system for policing" has taken many forms beyond uniformed surveillance and law enforcement. Further, not only has the system for policing only briefly referred to men and women in uniform, but that brief history has almost always involved private institutions operating in the shadow of the public police. And our review shows that the eventual rise of uniformed public policing – to the point that it seemed to cover over private security agencies -- was an arduous process that required the alignment of very specific conceptual, structural, and instrumental "conditions of possibility," which include:

(1) a belief in the primacy of growing, free markets to serve individuals – largely free from all but the most minimal forms of governmental intervention and regulation;

(2) a belief in the necessity of a state-driven social safety net that was dependent upon expert knowledge;

(3) a strong and developed tax base, founded on a thriving industrial economy, to fund large state services, including policing;

(4) mixed-use and open urban spaces, which made it more difficult for private interests to contain the benefits of the security that they purchased, owing to the free-rider problem;

(5) instrumental action on the part of powerful individuals, who preferred state-driven and supported public policing to overcome the free rider issues of more private policing.

When we consider the current situation, however, we see that these conditions have massively changed -- and with very different conditions of possibility in place, a major recalibration of the policing system is both necessary and desirable.

The Current Challenge: Policing in an Era of Political and Economic Turmoil

There are six important indicators that suggest that the current system for policing is in need of adjustment:

(1) Spending on policing has been mushrooming in Canada and across the Western democracies for over two decades. Total spending on policing in Canada was over 12.6 billion in 2010 -- more than double its 1997 level. This spending currently takes up to 50% of municipal government budgets across the country. In 2011, the number of

police officers reached 69,500 representing seven consecutive years of growth and the highest police officer strength since 1981;

(2) Studies show that police morale and officer health is in decline (Duxbury and Higgins 2012). These are sure signs of an organization that is being pulled in too many directions, being asked to do too many things that are out of alignment with its core functions, authorities, and capacities;

(3) Public perceptions of public police fairness and impartiality have been slipping of late – reaching relative low points in their cyclical levels of support over the past few decades (Reiner 2010). It is clear that the public have very high expectations for the police organization, which may be unrealistic in scope;

(4) Partly a result of, and partly driving, public appetites for greater amounts of security, the private security industry has been growing across Canada at an astronomical rate since the late 1970s – picking up renewed vigor since the terrorist outrages of 9/11 (Neocleous 2007). Whatever else is happening, it is clear that corporations and the public do not feel that the public police on their own are capable of meeting their full range of security needs, in all forms of collective space;

(5) Despite declines in overall recorded crime rates, crime is known to be expanding in the realms of cyberspace and finance and emergent forms of technology are being exploited by the criminal element – forcing policing and security agencies to catch up.

(6) In light of these troubling signs, there is a clear need for a recalibration of the system of policing in Canada and elsewhere. Applying the analytic framework developed in this historical review, we can identify the current conceptual, structural, and instrumental drivers of change to help us to actively steer this process of policing reform.

Conceptual Challenges: From Free-market Neoliberalism to the New Regulatory State

There is little agreement as to the form that the modern global economy will or ought to take. All divided parties are nevertheless united on the point that the future is likely to be uncertain and volatile. In an era of unpredictable market behavior and massive movements of goods and people around the planet, the traditional objectives of centralized, directed government management of the details of daily life fall by the wayside. The ground is simply moving too fast beneath our feet for any centralized, "expert' institution to plan and implement programs for directs governance (Burris, Kempa and Shearing 2008).

Increasingly dynamic and interconnected markets have made it much more difficult to forecast economic outcomes – and, as a result it is more difficult for governments to carry on with the centuries-old Enlightenment tradition of the rational management. Rather than

designing optimal programs for governance from the center of either government or large organizations, it is now widely accepted that uncertainty demands more governmental and corporate agility and new forms of organizational structure and planning to achieve it.

The new political and economic consensus is that the state and big governments are back – while not necessarily doing the direct rowing of providing all public services, then certainly by doing more of the steering through regulating the contribution of other agencies. Rather than the old command-and-control welfare liberalism, or even the free-market laissez-faire of neoliberalism, we have seen the rise to dominance of the new regulatory state (Burris, Kempa and Shearing 2008; Levi-Faur 2005).

Centralized bureaucracies – such as the public police – are going to have to rethink the skills they look for in their leaders, and reform their pay, promotions, and other incentive structures to reward ingenuity, innovation and flexibility, rather than dogged adherence to old systems or longevity of service.

The consensus of this new paradigm is that modern governance of public institutions will need a great deal of agility – more flexibly designed organizational and management structures -- so that they can respond quickly to the directives of skilled, outward looking leadership who are scanning the horizon for shifting challenges and conditions. Centralized bureaucracies – such as the public police – are going to have to rethink the skills they look for in their leaders, and reform their pay, promotions, and other incentive structures to reward ingenuity, innovation and flexibility, rather than dogged adherence to old systems or longevity of service.

The mentalities of the new regulatory state are already partially reflected in new programs for policing, notably those that fall within the "new professionalism" paradigm. New professionalism is distinct from the professionalism of the 1950s and 60s in the sense that the public police are no longer the exclusive experts of crime control, but rather key players in coordinating community safety – who go about this business in a disciplined fashion, keeping track of successes and failures of various partnerships (Gascon and Foglesong 2010).

Despite some promising signs, these "new regulatory state" ambitions for a new professionalism can only be given limited expression in our current, unreformed modern public institutions. The police are simply not set up yet to act as catalysts that can ignite networks of community safety and steer them in the direction of the public interest. Like many large modern public institutions, they are set up as "rowers" of first resort (i.e., providers

of police services) -- but not as broader "steering" mechanisms of community safety.

Further frustrating this need to steer and coordinate many agencies in service of the public interest in a dexterous fashion, the law and funding structures that together comprise the toolbox for the "art of governing" reflect many of our old beliefs and ways of doing things such as centralized planning and direct service delivery through expert bureaucracies. These outdated laws and governing structures are significant blocks to realizing skillful governance and the necessary recalibration for a system of policing.

It is clear from the language of reform that most police professionals and members of government want the state to coordinate the many agile institutions that contribute to public safety –and influence the entire "system for policing" – in service of the public good. The difficulty we face is that most of our laws, institutions, and practices were designed for a previously highly compartmentalized world in which policing was limited to a single, bureaucratic agency that directly enforced rules and maintained disciplinary surveillance only in public space. A major rework of the legal framework for policing is therefore in order, and should be guided by the practical lessons of what is seen to be working in partnership policing on the ground.

Structural Challenges: Fiscal Crises and Technology Boom

In order to grow indefinitely, industrial markets require: (1) a ready pool of consumers with money to spend; (2) a ready pool of producers with skills to apply; and (3) a steady stream of raw materials and energy to fuel the engines of production.

The above were the characteristics of the Western world during the middle decades of the 20th century, but that situation no longer holds. Canadian municipalities are faced with an eroding tax base, an aging workforce, and high deficits. Economist Don Drummond, in his extensive review of public services in Ontario (Drummond Report 2012) has noted that change of large magnitude in the next few years is a dire structural necessity:

> *(Eliminating Ontario's massive deficit) can be accomplished through reforms to the delivery of public services that not only contribute to deficit elimination, but are also desirable in their own right. Affordability and excellence are not incompatible; they can be reconciled by greater efficiency, which serves both the fiscal imperative and Ontarians' desire for better-run programs (Drummond Report 2012: Chap.1).*

Whatever the challenges to modern public policing presented by the emerging new economy, it would seem they will not be solved as before through greater public expenditure.

In addition we find ourselves in a situation where shifts in property relations and technology have solved many of the free rider problems encouraged the expansion of public policing and security at the outset of the 20th century. So much of our collective life now happens in "mass private property" – expansive private spaces such as shopping malls and other leisure complexes – that it has become possible for property owners to guard the benefits of the security they purchase for themselves and the "members" that they admit to their spaces of private privilege (Kempa et al. 2004). Having initially expanded into mass private property, the public's appetite for private security has been whetted: security is now a commodity for sale, and thereby subject to constant promotion.

The proliferation of new threats to security and of the police resources to deal with issues of terrorism, asylum and illegal migration, identity theft and fraud, also pose a problem. Many of these new policing challenges are obviously associated with structural shifts in the global economy and the availability of new institutional technologies that increase global flows of people, information, goods, and virtual services. One of the principal concerns of state governments, and, by extension the police, has been to manage increasingly mobile virtual and real population and communication flows: a preoccupation with the circulation of people goods and information that parallels government concerns in the 16th and 17th centuries (Foucault 1977/2007).

There is simply no way that an institution set up to handle the security challenges of the 19th century industrial economy can continue to meet all of the security demands of a wildly changing, diversified modern global economy. Identifying what the police do best – and sticking to those core functions on the basis of evidence – will therefore be essential.

Instrumental Challenges: The Advocates for Private Policing

In contrast to the days of Robert Peel (1829) and Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1929) – many of the most influential reform voices are not calling for an even further expansion of public policing to respond to new policing demands. Instead, there is a large, powerful, and increasingly influential corporate class agitating for the expansion of private security services. Leading members of the profitable security industry are constantly lobbying government for the relaxation of laws and regulations that prevent them from claiming some of the core public policing functions.

At the same time, questioning the amount of money spent on public policing is gathering political and public momentum within Canada (Kempa 2013). While the public is willing to spend money on effective policing services,

they are increasingly demanding to see tangible improvements to public safety and security in return.

Canadian Policing Futures

Our review of the modern history of policing shows us that Western governments gradually came to separate and compartmentalize "public safety" into apparently separate "policing" versus "social and economic policy" and "community well-being." In recent decades, there has been an effort to reconcile these elements of public safety into a coherent, coordinated whole. The problem has been that we have largely tried to bring it together by working through institutional and legal frameworks that reflect the old compartmentalization of the middle decades of the 20th century. The result has been insufficient coordination, decreased effectiveness and failure to significantly enhance efficiency in piecemeal efforts to bring the pieces of public safety back together. Beyond scarce resources and new challenges to public order, it follows that our laws and current ways of organizing policing are the most significant blocks to recalibrate the system for policing with a newly professionalized public services at its core.

Lessons from Abroad and at Home: Innovations in Policing and Community Safety

Various policing options surveyed in the United States, United Kingdom, and across Canada provide interesting ideas for future institutional arrangements for public policing and public security.

(1) Public Safety Canada is leading the charge to assemble evidence of "what works" in community safety partnerships across the country. As a part of this question, the government is considering how best to structure and keep track of policing research in Canada to see evidence inform policing practice.

(2) In the United States, efforts are being made to get beyond the initial "shock" reaction to the economic contraction of 2008, which involved massive, "emergency" cuts to law enforcement agencies. The acknowledged trouble in seeking to save money anywhere and everywhere was that successful programs were sometimes cut simply because they were easiest to eliminate.

(3) In Britain, calls are being made to ramp up citizen participation in the shaping of community safety programs. Enhanced commitment to "participatory budgeting" -- wherein pools of local monies earmarked for community safety are allocated on the basis of public guidance -- has been identified as a key measure for promoting community buy-in.

(4) In Australia, an effort to rationalize the police technology and equipment procurement processes is well underway.

What these distinct programs hold in common is a return to the historic idea of widening the concept of "policing" beyond uniformed rules enforcement to the broad pursuit of public safety and well-being; a set of processes that goes far beyond the public police.

Our main challenge, therefore, is not simply to find better cost efficiency but to find ways to achieve public safety and well-being in a coordinated, blended fashion across the multiple policing agencies that make a contribution to this broader policing enterprise.

Synergistic, broad policing programs -- such as Saskatchewan's community safety partnerships and others that are being chronicled by Public Safety Canada -- that are demonstrated to be working well on the basis of actual empirical evaluation deserve our rigorous review. We must then use that grounded information to design supportive institutional and legal architectures to promote the spread and proliferation of these new public safety models. Rather than attempt to theorize our way beyond current problems, it will be necessary to look carefully at empirical innovation on the ground and allow experience to guide our outdated thinking.

It will be these effective, synthetic, coordinated public security models that demonstrate efficiency and cost savings that will show us where the law is out of date. Rather than arguing that a particular model from another context ought to be transferred in a tactical sense to the Canadian context, the best strategy involves identifying and answering the same set of democratic and good governance questions that other jurisdictions have raised such as:

(1) How can we best adapt institutional arrangements for civilian oversight and input into broader policing practices?

Given that the policing and research community will soon generate an array of empirically based best practice options and strategies for the future of policing in Canada, it will be essential that the civilian oversight bodies hold these options to the standard of the public interest.

Since most of our options for the future of community safety will involve the police working in some degree of partnership with a wide range of private and civil agencies, we will need to be sure that our accountability mechanisms can hold all the agencies mobilized in the public name to account.

In the United Kingdom, major innovations in policing governance have been implemented to catch up to the new realities of networks of community safety. In place of Police Authorities -- the appointed civilian oversight bodies

charged with maintaining the operational responsibility of public police services, highly analogous to Canada's police services boards – the government has established the elected office of Police and Crime Commissioners. They will have the authority to oversee all agencies mobilized by the state – not just police – that make a contribution to public safety.

There are other institutional options to achieve the same aims of extending oversight to broad networks of community safety. In Canada, the provinces have registrars for private security/policing. It may be possible to increase coordination between the existing police services boards and these provincial registrars to ensure that neither public nor private security bodies are violating the public interest. The best approaches for the civilian governance of public safety will have to be chosen on the basis of evidence. To this end, practitioners and other stakeholders in Canadian policing reform should pay close attention to the results of the initial evaluations of the UK's new Police and Crime Commissioners (Stevens 2013).

(2) Proper evaluation of shifting police strategies and innovations in community safety must be undertaken and built upon.

All institutional reorganizations and redistributions of responsibilities across the nodes of security networks must actually achieve savings, efficiency, and good outcomes. It will simply not be enough to make policing change for change's sake. All changes must be kept track of, and properly evaluated through broad economic and social evaluation measures to ensure that changes are desirable and sustainable in the long term.

To this end, the coordination of empirical research into innovations in policing across Canada will be a tremendous asset. Having a repository of police science information at the disposal of police leaders and civilian oversight bodies will push forward discussions about how best to run collaborations in community safety -- while avoiding the "reinvention of the wheel" through repeating experiments that may not have been successful elsewhere and in similar circumstances. A critical component of such evaluation must include community viewpoints and confidence in innovative programs and policing.

Concluding Comments

History has shown that policing reform has been forced and enabled by major economic restructuring. Given that the current conceptual, structural, and instrumental challenges for community safety are also of historical significance it follows that a major recalibration of the current system for policing will also be required.

Reinventing a centuries-old, multi- agency institutional model for policing is a difficult

endeavor, one that requires skilled leadership to build upon demonstrated experimentation and best practice. This paper has attempted to underline the importance of understanding the ways in which our frameworks for thinking and doing policing are contingent upon our economic context. Armed with a comprehension of the limits of our current ways of doing things, we may be able to cast a fresh eye on some of our most interesting innovations in community safety -- and develop the institutional and legal frameworks necessary to support them.

History shows us is that as the world becomes an unfamiliar place filled with unfamiliar challenges, relying on established ways of thinking and acting from the past will likely let us down.

As Albert Einstein has famously quipped, "you can't solve problems using the same thinking that created them." To this we can now add, "diagnosing the origins and limits of current thinking is the first step to getting outside the box." What we are looking for are new ways of bringing together legal, economic, and social governance to promote community safety. We need a new answer to the fundamental question of how best government, police services, and civilian oversight bodies can deploy power in both the public and private spheres to steer processes of community safety in the public interest.

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